

PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS IN THE WEST

A sample survey of later 20th Century
Western Thought for the average Indian reader

(Paul Gregorios)

One way of looking at what is called modern philosophy in the West is to see it as an attempted tour de force in what we Indians call pramanavičara. They call it epistemology. In India we have traditionally, at least since the rise of Sankhya and probably well before it, operated with the three pramanas or measuring-sticks for our knowledge of truth - pratyakṣa (sense-perception), anumāna (inference or reason) and śabda (Scripture and tradition). Until the rise of the modern period, Western philosophy also operated with these three, though European philosophers may not have enumerated their canons as three.

Whether one takes Descartes or Kant as the starting point of modern Western philosophy, they are both characterized by a desire for certainty without using the third principle, i.e. of śabda or revealed knowledge. It was the re-enthronement of Reason in the Enlightenment that ensued in the dethronement of Revelation, and Christian theologians have been hard at work seeking to reinstate Revelation on the throne of knowledge, without much success in convincing the unbeliever.

Philosophy, by dint of its very variety, calls for a test of certainty. When the Protestant Reformation

succeeded in overthrowing the uneasy religious consensus based on authoritarian church dogmas, canon laws and moral rules laid down by an official magisterium, a wave of uncertainty swept over the European consciousness -- voiced at least for the English-speaking world first and soon for the French and the Germans as well, by Locke and Hume. Bishop Berkeley sought hard to stem the tide of skepticism, but with only temporary success.

The Lockian question about the meaning of meaning remains still at the centre of the Western debate. This quest for knowledge of knowledge is in fact a search for a substitute for the śabdapramāna, which was the basis of certainty in the authoritarian Church-dominated European mind of the pre-Enlightenment period. Only by an analysis of the knowing process itself in modern philosophy we can know for certain that what we know is real knowledge. For Locke, "to attach meaning to an utterance is to make it 'stand as a mark' for one or more 'internal conceptions' or 'ideas' ['] on one's own mind, and language's main task is to transfer ideas from one mind to another".(1) With some significant differences, Locke, Berkeley and Hume shared this common ground. Locke

(1) The philosophical errors in this theory are interestingly treated in Jonathan Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume : Central Themes, New York, Oxford University Press; Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, see p. 1 ff.

further held that our ultimate evidence for the way the world is, consists in our own sensory states, or the state in which the perceiver is while perceiving an object. It is this way of arguing directly from our sensory states to the objective realm, or identifying or making the transition between 'appearance and reality' which constitutes the perennial problem for philosophy everywhere in India as in the West.

This causal connection between object and mental state, or between reality and appearance was the nexus which Hume broke leading Anglo-Saxon philosophy into a basic skepticism from which Kant heroically sought to rescue it. For continental European philosophy at least Kant accomplished that double task of demonstrating the impossibility of a rationally constructed metaphysics and providing a fairly interesting account of the rational knowing process as a synthetic judgment composed jointly by sense-data and by the a priori categories of the mind which belong to its structure. This Kantian starting-point, with necessary modifications provides the basis for more than one influential school of contemporary Western philosophy. Three of the most important of these are (a) Neo-Kantianism, (b) Phenomenological systems and (c) existence philosophies (often wrongly called Existentialism, though they are not systematic "isms").

1. Neo-Kantianism

Neo-Kantians accept the basic position of Kant that the judgments of pure reason are synthetic a priori, but try to keep their own systems free from superficial or unnecessary "metaphysical" and "pre-critical" elements which, according to them, abound in Kant. Ernst Cassirer, the most prominent of the neo-Kantians died at Princeton in 1945, though his three-volume Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (first published in German Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen, 3 Bde 1923-29) still remains influential. Kant did not have the advantage of knowing our exact sciences and the neo-Kantians (especially Cohen, Natorp and Cassirer of the Marburg School) sought to correlate their philosophical systems to current knowledge in the natural sciences. The other school (called the South-West German School) led by Windelband, Rickert and Lask concentrated on the development of a philosophy of values. Neo-Kantianism, temporarily suppressed by positivistic-analytic approaches on the one hand, and by Existenz philosophies on the other, may yet stage a come-back. Cassirer's re-interpretation of Rousseau as a Renaissance humanist (2) who saw the need for a new science of man which had as its primary task that of changing society, and which would serve as a pre-condition for the natural sciences, is now receiving fresh attention (3). Both Kant, who called Rousseau the

(2) See E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Boston, Beacon Press, 1955, Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, Hamden, Conn. Archon Books, 1961, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, New York, Columbia Univ. Press. 1954

(3) See e.g. Pulitzer-Prize Winning author Ernest Becker's The Structure of Evil, An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man, New York, The Free Press, London, Collier Macmillan publishers. 1976.

"Newton of the moral world" (4), and Marx who wanted to shift the task of philosophy from that of explaining the world to that of changing the world, owe their basic inspirations to Rousseau and to his demand for a science of the nature of man as a standard of criticism and the criterion of betterment. Even Levi-Strauss's Structuralism has this orientation (5).

2. Phenomenological Systems

Phenomenology is a much misunderstood word. Its founding father (beginning of the 20th century) was Edmund Husserl who sought to establish a pure transcendental idealism as a science of eidetic essences in consciousness. He pulled away all knowledge to the subjective pole and thereby sought to do away with the "thing-in-itself" which in Kant remained unknown. All knowledge is immanent in consciousness. There is nothing in the external world which is not already in the human mind; ~~the~~ noema of an object in consciousness with its nucleus x and the set of qualities or attributes around the nucleus, corresponds exactly with the object in the external world with its own nucleus x and adhering set of qualities. In the process of intentionality which is thethetic act of projecting the noema on to an object, the object with all its qualities if fully internalized, the noematic nucleus replacing the reell nucleus, but leaving no unthought residuum.

(4) See Cassirer, 1955, p. 280

(5) See C. Levi-Strauss, A World on the Wane, New York, criterion Books, 1961, pp. 389-392

Thus by a pure analysis of consciousness with its innate ideas of noemata and the noetic process of intentionality, we are able to know that our knowledge is true knowledge. After the fall of Hegelian idealism, Husserl, Brentano, Meinong and others made use of an introspective psychology, to build up a transcendental idealism without the aid of metaphysics, using the methods of mathematical science, to relate to the new world of Naturwissenschaft. Franz Brentano developed his Evidenzlehre as Erkenntnistheorie. A comprehensive classification of noetic-eidetic objects was sufficient ground for certainty about knowledge. Both Husserl and Brentano were ~~encountered~~ ^{Concerned} about certainty in knowledge. Husserl sought to lay the foundations for a Philosophy of Science, freed from all psychological prejudices or preconditions as in Kant, freed from all relativism and skepticism. Logical analysis is not analysis of the knowing act, which would lead to psychologism but the analysis of meaning. In this Husserl's (1859-1938) phenomenology differs from Brentano's (1838-1917) for whom right judgment of the evidence was of the essence. Husserl's phenomenology, on the other hand, by "bracketing out" the world in a temporary suspension of all judgment about its nature or existence concentrates on a pure mathematical analysis of subjective consciousness.

In phenomenology, besides the schools of Brentano and Husserl, perhaps the most influential is still that of

Max Scheler (1874-1928) who refused to walk the way of Husserl, and insisted on an ontological understanding of the human person and human values and human relationships to beings. He brought into his phenomenology the growing body of thought on social and personal ethics, as well as his own vast erudition in biology, psychology and philosophy of religion. His was no mere intellectual quest, but a search for a way of life - a Lebensphilosophie. But he too had to ground it on an Erkenntnislehre or pramāṇavicāra, based on an analysis of personhood, knowledge and values, on a striking phenomenological analysis of the feeling of sympathy, on a theory of the stages of life and on a philosophy of religion.

Scheler too could not use the Śabdapramāna in any explicit way, because the 'scientific' culture forbade it. He took over from Husserl the method of eidetic intuition or wesensschau. He gave a central place to feeling again, in this reaching against the intellectualism of the Enlightenment. For Scheler the real was not the spiritual or the ideal, but rather the level of feeling and drive, out of which arises the creative power which propels the course of world and history, and which enables the inner centre of personhood to participate in a living way in the very substance of things. Knowledge itself is to be seen as part of this creativity. It is this creative urge that could be spoken of as the divine-in-the world which enables the

apprehension of substances, the emergence of values, the relation with the Absolute, and thus makes man the meaning-giver.

Scheler was deeply influenced by the personalism and individualism of his age. Here he ~~struggles~~ struggles in his Sabdapramana from a particular Christian tradition of western individual personalism; his individuelle Geistperson, however, does not need to "love God" as much as to "love in God" (amare in Deo, not amare Deum), since it is in the world-life of God that man participates. Denying ^{the} Hegelian assumption that Geist or Spirit is the real, he had to see Man as Geist in Trieb, the Spirit in a creative drive. His inability to finally reconcile these two principles of Spirit and Drive is perhaps his Achilles' heel.

The feeling of sympathy is central for him; it is this that makes love possible and to see the centre of reality as a universelle Liebesgemeinschaft aller individuellen Geistpersonen (the universal love-community of all individual spirit-persons) in which all human beings are co-guilty and co-responsible. His philosophy thus becomes a phenomenology of feeling - of love and hate, of sympathy and empathy, of taking interest. There is no more reductionism as in the phenomenology of Husserl, Brentano and Meinong. It is a vast enterprise of seeing life whole.

Scheler's works still exercise a considerable amount of influence in philosophical circles concerned with the future of man (6) who are worried about the hiatus between science and life, which makes man an alien without a sense of unity and participation in the universe. It is not merely the social scientist who today seeks for a science that transcends the subject-object polarity and allows for meaningful participation in the cosmic process. The physical scientists, at least the more thoughtful ones, are joining him in the quest. It was no cosmic mysticism for which Scheler yearned. For him "it seems to be more or less a rule (of which we have as yet no further understanding) that the actual realization of the capacity for cosmic identification cannot take place directly in relation to external Nature, but is mediated indirectly in that sense of unity between man and man" (7). Scheler insisted that "man's point of entry into identification with the life of the cosmos lies where that life is nearest and in closest affinity to his own, namely in another man".

Scheler accused "the Capitalistic social outlook of Western man" of being responsible for seeing the world

(6) His two most important works are now available in good English translations : On the Eternal in Man (trans. Bernard Noble) New York, Harper, 1960; The Nature of Sympathy (trans. Peter Heath) London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.

(7) The Nature of Sympathy, p. 108

as an aggregation of movable and immovable goods, and of suppressing the capacity of man to identify himself with the life of the universe. Max Scheler's phenomenology, despite its philosophical problems bids fair to attract more study as time goes on and as the question about man begins to occupy the centre of the scientific quest. But there too, the methodology is the ground of certainty.

3. Existenz philosophies

One can hardly define a philosophical school called Existentialism, though many use that generic term to refer to the philosophies of Heidegger and Sartre, Marcel and Jaspers and many others of lesser importance. We will not tarry to discuss these systems in detail, except to indicate that though the tempo and tone of Existentialism is very much evident today among the young, as a way of philosophizing it is very much on the wane. Its basically individualistic and ahistoric frame of reference leaves too much out of account. It might have had a role to play in the milieu of the French Resistance of the war years and in the upswing of the so-called New Morality. Even the star of Heidegger seems to be setting, since he has been unable to provide answers to his own questions or to carry through his project of getting to the knowledge of Sein (being) through the analysis of man's existence (Daseinsanalyse).

Heidegger, however, remains an important thinker of the 20th century West. He radicalized Husserl's phenomenology, and went beyond Scheler's creative drive, to pose the question of Being in a comprehensive way. He could not be satisfied with the mathematical rationalism of Husserl or the comforting idea of Scheler that the human community of love was the heart of reality. Being was unlike beings and could not be grasped in terms of beings. Scheler's pantheistic Spirit-and-Person metaphysics was too naive and lazy, too sleepily giving an account of reality - an account which lulls you into thinking that you know it when you really don't.

Heidegger's was an appeal to the depths, to abandon the common-sense standpoint from which the mystery of Being must of necessity remain concealed. Truth needs unveiling, waking up, not just description. And that needs a startlingly new methodology. He creates this methodology by a radical twist of Husserl's phenomenological epoché. Man is a fallen being, forgetful of Being. Man is ek-sistent, standing out away from the Reality of Being. Anamnesis or waking up the memory is the way to certainty.

It is notorious that there are two Heideggers, the early and the late. The early (1927) Heidegger of Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) is related to the late Heidegger of the post-war years almost like the Wittgenstein of the

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Tractatus and the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein created two philosophies, while Heidegger came quite near to it, but his second one remains an unfinished task. Since 1950 he has published a series of profound essays : Was heisst Denken ? (What does it mean to think?) Was ist das - die Philosophie? (What is this thing - Philosophy?), Der Satz vom Grund (The proposition from its foundation), Die Frage nach dem Ding (The question of Thing) - the very titles are intriguing. And then there is the two-volume work on Nietzsche.

It was Franz Wiedmann (8) who suggested that the meditative, creative prose of Heidegger is better understood by Far Easterners (he meant people of Japan and Korea) than by the westerner used to cold, dissective, analytic language. He refers especially to German university professors and students having a lot of fun and mirth with Heidegger's sentences like "Let Being be what it is and leave it closed in" (Das Sein zu lassen als das, was es ist, und sich einzulassen).

Heidegger in fact invokes the ancient mystical principle that Being is avāchya or ineffable. People must have expected from the early Heidegger of Being and Time that he would lead us from his early analysis of human existence as floating jetsam caught in dread, anxiety and guilt, swept by the swift flow of death along the river of time, to an understanding of the Being which reveals itself through beings. They

(8) Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart, Benziger Verlag, Zurich, Einsiedeln, Köln, 1972, p. 24 ff.

thought he was another existential philosopher like Sartre or Jaspers, using the phenomenological method to describe the human condition. But Heidegger forcefully and vigorously denied any relation to existential philosophy of that kind (9). His was a different quest. But what was the difference? That is still a puzzle, not easy to solve verbally.

He denies that he had said anything in Being and Time about the relation between Being and Existence. Being is not there for talkative man to catch with his talk. Man must stand reverently before Being and let Being do the talking : and when he is able really to listen to this silent speaking of Being, there is not much left for man to say. This is why a Japanese mystic well versed in Zen Buddhism is better able to understand Heidegger than the ordinary German professor. Philosophy, at least the philosophy of the future, must deny itself the luxury of words - say less, but let what you say bring about the appeal for a return to Being, about which we have become forgetful.

I think (but I am not certain) that I understand Heidegger at this point, but here I go multiplying words about what he means. Isn't there something self-defeating about this literary-philosophical enterprise, in which we try to explain at book-length what a man like Heidegger says

(9) See his letter on Humanismus addressed to Jean Beaufret, Paris, printed in M. Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, Bern, Francke Verlag, zweite Auflage, 1954, pp. 71 ff.

in a sentence, while the whole point is that the less said the better, for words mislead.

Very few people seem to understand Heidegger. Many suspect that he is fooling them or trying to feel superior by not talking to them in language they can understand. Some accuse him of having been a nazi collaborator or being an anti-semitic thinker. But still he remains a topic of discussion in German and French philosophical circles to this day.

Heidegger was also preoccupied with the problem of pramānavicāra, which nowadays for European philosophy means Erkenntnistheorie or theory of knowledge. His work on Kant was an attempt to focus on this problem by re-interpreting Kant's philosophical effort as an attempt at fundamental ontology. Fundamental ontology means to Heidegger Seinslehre, a doctrine of Being; but that is precisely the problem - Being cannot be caught in doctrines.

Heidegger started out on the line shown by Max Scheler, that the way to the true interiorization of and participation in the cosmos is through the understanding of the other man. But Heidegger started not with the other man, but man as exemplified in myself, for it is there that I have privileged access. Heidegger could not however make the transition from dasein analyse of oneself to either the neighbour or the cosmos, not to speak of Being itself. So he seems to abandon the earlier track, and resorts to a new way,

which looks suspiciously like the mystical approach in a philosophical garb. He cannot quite make it work. The later Heidegger is thus likely to remain an unfinished work, providing ample scope for future Ph.D. theses as to what Heidegger's true intentions were. He certainly did not get to any principle of certainty.

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Karl Jaspers covers the same ground as the early Heidegger, but their programmes are quite different. Jaspers is more what ordinary people understand by the word Existentialism. How to live one's own life - that is the typical quest of the Existentialist, and that is what Jaspers tries to describe in philosophical language. No objective understanding of the nature of man is possible. Since humanity is not a frozen datum to be so objectively studied and described like other things. For I am the subject, not an object among other objects, but a subject who stands over against all objects. Unlike Kant, who sought to solve the problem of knowledge by analyzing the process of knowledge, Jaspers as a typical existentialist, following in the heritage of Phenomenology, tries to analyse the subjective consciousness in all its finitude and strife, disharmony and uncertainty, guilt, anxiety and dread, battered by time and change, groundless and tossed about.

The uncertainty about the world and my own standing in it is not resolved by any philosophical theory of knowledge; no amount of knowledge about knowledge can give me the stability and the ground to stand which I need. In fact, I cannot stand at all. I must glide, but glide without being carried away. Neither **P**ositivism nor Idealism gives me the ground on which I can stand firm. They are rather prisons; ~~t~~he first would make everything into an object, myself included; I become merely a link in the chain of causality, bound by that chain. Idealism explains everything in a way which makes me an insignificant cog in the great wheel of Being or Spirit.

Existenz, for Jaspers at least at one point, seems to be the equivalent for soul; but then if you define Existenz you objectify it and destroy it. It is exemplified as the irreducible core of man not to be grasped in concepts; it is life as a possibility; it can be affirmed or denied, but not defined. It functions through free decision; by its power to free itself from causality and initiate other effects by exercising its will in freedom and power. Of course, at least in **J**aspers, man attains this core of his being or Existenz, only in communication with other Existences - thus individualism is slightly mitigated in the Jasperian brand of Existentialism. (Heidegger seems to have been less bothered with the social aspect of human dasein, unlike Max Scheler and Karl Jaspers).

Jaspers builds on Kant's work and is dependent on it. He builds also on the academic work of the neo-kantians, but what he builds on that academic foundation is itself not susceptible

to rational demonstration^{of} to be checked by scientific criteria. This is a characteristic of all Existenz-philosophies that they offer very little of a rational basis on which to evaluate their thought. Hence while Existentialism at one time enjoyed some prestige in academic circles, today its standing in the universities of Europe is very low. So long as philosophy remains a university-related academic discipline, it is unlikely that Existentialism can continue to claim any high Wissenschaftlich status, and this seems one good reason why it is now very much on the wane in Europe and the West in general. Even Sartre and Marcel exercise very little fascination in academic circles, though the latter remains a live option in Roman Catholic intellectual circles. The philosophical journals nowadays carry very few articles on any of the Existentialists. For they give no objective ground for certainty.

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4. The Structuralist Quest for Certainty

Structuralism as a scientific method of philosophy-anthropology, is inseparably linked with the name of Claude Levi-Strauss (born 1908), Professor for Social Anthropology in the Collège de France, who resuscitated the old quest made known by Sir James Frazer's The Golden Bough and Bronislaw Malinowski's popular works on the way primitive societies "functioned". Professor Edmund Leach has given us an admirably lucid but inconclusive account of structuralism in his brief book on Claude

Levi-Strauss (10).

In a sense Structuralism is a swing of the pendulum to the opposite pole from Existentialism. Today the fashionable words are "structural" and "systems-analysis", and the structuralists claim to have discovered the ideology for a technical age, the ideology to replace all ideologies. Its concern is with the systematic structure of human language and culture, and its methodology basically mathematical-cybernetic. Leave nothing to mere chance; compute accurately, taking into account all the quantifiable variables. Get the right signs to signify the right entities, find out their mathematical relations. That way comes certainty.

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) laid the foundations for structuralism, in the Geneva school of Linguistics. But it is only in the last 15 years or so that it has become a fashionable way of philosophising. The other great names in the Structuralist school are Lucien Goldmann (born 1913), Professor for the Sociology of Literature and Philosophy in Paris and Brussels, and Roland Barthes' (born 1915) literary critic and semiologist at the Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris. It would be a mistake to include the American

(10) In the series Fontana Modern Masters, edited by Frank Kermode, Wm Collins and Co Ltd, London, 1970. See also H.W. Scheffer, Structuralism in Anthropology in the special number of Yale French Studies No 36/37 (1966) on Structuralism : Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, London, 1967. Much clearer is Philip Petit, The Concept of Structuralism a Critical Analysis, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1975. His criticism is damaging though not very profound.

Noam Chomsky (born 1928) whose constant use of the word "structure" (deep structure, surface structure) in his linguistic philosophy should not mislead people into clubbing him together with the three French Structuralists. Chomsky's concern is with the structure of language, while the Structuralists seek to describe how society functions, language being but one aspect of social structure and communication. Semantics is not semiology. The first deals with meanings of words, the latter with signs and the signified.

Ferdinand de Saussure had already indicated that myths and rites are symbol-systems like language; also the patterns made by the lips for a deaf lip-reader, and the signals used by armies, boy-scouts, etc. The main thing is to distinguish between the two classes (a) the signifying (le signifiant) and (b) the signified (le signifié). To the first class belong all signs and markers, expressions, pictures, etc.; to the latter realities like meanings, ideas, thoughts, etc.

Claude Levi-Strauss (11) took de Saussure's ideas and developed them in term of human community with Marx and Freud as his main signposts, with his vast anthropological erudition as material and of all things Geology as a type of reality-account with its own structure and movement - an enterprise that reminds one of the effort of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Levi-Strauss wants to lay bare the ground-structure which regulates what we see as passing, random and accidental or contingent. In this the effort bears comparison to the effort

of Heidegger to get to sein through the Seiende, an effort which has so far proved to be abortive. Just as in Freud the unconscious explained many conscious acts which otherwise remained unintelligible, Levi-Strauss seeks to make the accidental and the contingent comprehensible by making known the not-so-obvious structures which coordinate them.

Lucien Goldman tells us that all human data are comprehensible in two synchronous processes - one, destructuralisation of the structured; the second, structuration of the unstructured. Man initiates the two processes in his creative work. First he takes things apart, as children do instinctively, to see what the parts are. ~~This is always necessary - to see what the parts are.~~ This is always necessary - to see individual parts in their detail and to know them as they are. But then he has to see their interrelations and put them together in some coherent order, so as to make "sense" of the details. Like a poet, who knows many words, if he puts down a lot of these words on a piece of paper, it makes no sense. But when he puts them together in a special way, they signify something which the words by themselves did not signify. It is his way of putting them together that has created this reality which did not exist before.

(11) The following works of Claude Lévi-Strauss are now available in English :

Elementary Structures of Kinship, Boston, Beacon, 1969

The Savage Mind, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966

Structural Anthropology, New York, Basic Books, 1963

But the putting together was not according to some given rules consciously followed. It was more of an unconscious process. What the poet does, even the scientific researcher has to do. Knowing the individual elements in their detail, he puts them together in a specially structured way, and the individual elements are given by him a meaning and significance which they did not have before. Man is a meaning-creator by being a structure-maker.

Now do that same thing to the flow of history, to the river of time. Unveil the structure of the time process, which is a dynamic one. Not merely unveil, but break it up and build it up again. That is what the University Revolt of Paris 1968 meant. Daniel Cohn-Bendit who led that revolution explained what he was trying to do. The present structure of society does not bring out the true significance of man in the cosmos. A different rearrangement of the elements is necessary. Now, in the present structure of dehumanized, alienating, capitalist-industrialist, managerial society, the key element in the structure is the trained personnel who manage or man it. These are manufactured in the University. If you can break up the university, there will be no more technological-industrial society. If you can destroy the manipulative managerial system which runs industry and university for the benefit of the oppressors you can destroy the system. So use word and symbol and violence to destroy the old system, so that a new structure which gives more meaning to all the elements, can be erected on its ruins.

The word, dominated by rhetoric and deceptive "missionary" talk - break it up. Capture the parole as once the revolutionaries captured the Bastille. Replace the word as a structural, functional agent.

The symbols, ~~destroy~~ them or capture them, ^TThe motor-car, symbol of privacy, individualism and property, ~~destroy~~ it. The barricades, revolutionary symbol, capture it or put it up. Clothes, abandon the styles which speak of middle-class bourgeois respectability, invent new styles fit for the revolution.

Violence, the expression of ^Will and ^Spontaneity. Take to the streets, the symbols of unfettered space and language and contact - anti-institutional, unparliamentary, anti-intellectual space, the space of unmediated access. Express your violence in the streets and break up the structure.

That was how Roland Barthes (12) saw the 1968 May Revolution in Paris. It was a structuralist movement, structuralistically to be interpreted.

(12) Roland Barthes is a prolific writer. Some of his more important works, for our purpose, are

Critiques et vérité, Paris 1966

Système de la Mode, Paris 1967

Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits, in Communications, 8/1966, pp. 1-27.

L'empire des signes, Paris 1970.

Creation is an unconscious process; but even an unconscious process, like painting good art, can be helped by some rules. We get these rules by analyzing different structures. Analyzing them without reducing or oversimplifying, with full attention to details. Label and date each detail - don't say just "car", but say "Fiat 1100D, 1974, blue, upholstery red, tyre-walls white, kilometers run up to 15th September 1976, 36,732, etc.". Always add etc. after saying the maximum you can of the details, because no reality is so closed. New aspects may later come to light. Then describe how it fits into the system, how it is used, who makes it, markets it, maintains it, how it is related to other realities like roads, spaces, houses, furniture, etc. Say how it differs from the bus, the lorry, the bullock-cart, the horse and carriage, etc.

Clarify all identities and non identities. Man is part of nature. Man is different from the rest of nature. Wherein does the difference lie? In the fact that he uses fire to cook. He doesn't take the nature as it is given to him. He transforms it by cooking before he interiorizes it. Man is the animal who makes culture out of nature.

And if that is the identity of all men, it remains true that all men are not identical. They have names, their own non-identical identities. They have relations to each other : A is the sister of X, the wife of Y and the daughter of Z. Each one has such multiple relational identity which particularizes that person. All these relations must be labelled

with appropriate signs - that is one of the things which Semiology (semeion ^ἰGreek = sign) does. A whole algebra of relations, functional equations, begins to emerge.

To use this algebra of words, symbols, myths and poetry, to create a "poetic cosmography" which will liberate us from the tyranny of a monochromatic "scientific" world-view, this is what Levi-Strauss seeks to enable. He is not in any sense anti-science. If anything, he becomes too scientific in his minute attention to detail, that it may be difficult for him to put it all together. And he has not yet shown us how he himself would put it all together again.

Structuralism as a quest for certainty is again a painstaking philosophical enterprise that seeks to maintain the whole in relation to the parts and understand the parts in relation to the whole. It wants to keep all the details and yet allow the free play of creativity to put it together again. It can easily degenerate into the computerism or cybernetism which characterizes much that goes by the name of "Systems Analysis" today. The most glaring and widely noticed examples are the reports of the Club of Rome, about the Limits to Survival, which have recently stirred up so much debate.

Philosophical structuralism is, however, more than mere computerism or a simple reaction to Existentialism. It still remains an ambitious project to give new meaning to the manifold *one* encounters as the world.

Structuralism, which deals with "systems analysis", should, however, not be mistaken for a philosophical system like Phenomenology or even Existenz philosophy. It is more of a way, a method, a technique, for getting at reality and doing it with some assurance of certainty. Not every structuralist follows the French school of structuralism we have described above. The Marxist contribution to structuralism cannot be overlooked. (13) Jehn Brockman sees three way-stations along which Structuralism has developed. Moscow and St Petersburg (together), Prague and Paris. He finds its roots in Russian Formalism of the Twenties, a time of great intellectual and spiritual stirring-up in the wake of the Revolution of 1917.

The Moscow Linguistic Circle was formed in 1915, with Roman Jakobson (born 1896) as its leading figure. His analysis of poetry as structure made a great impact on Russian intellectual circles (14), and when he went to Prague in 1920 as cultural attaché at the Russian Embassy, he began to influence Czech thinkers, thus leading to the formation of the Prague Circle in March 1925, in which both Husserl and Carnap gave talks in 1935. Jakobson with his colleague Tynjanof set forth in 1928 a programme for structural analysis and research in poetry and literature. In 1965, when the Paris Journal Tel Quel published an article on Roman Jacobson on the 50th anniversary of the

(13) in his book Strukturalismus, Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg/München 1971.

(14) He is theoretician of Russian Futurism through his two influential books on Futurism (in Russian Futurizm - 1915) and New Russian Poetry (1921).

founding of the Moscow Linguistic Circle, ~~this~~ was a stimulation for French Structuralist thought.

Particularly in France, Existentialism, Marxism and Structuralism have been conducting a three-cornered debate for some time now. When Sartre published his Critique de la raison dialectique in 1960 (15), it started off a debate which still goes on. The great Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget in his work on Structuralism (16) examines the arguments of Levi-Strauss (in the last chapter of La pensée sauvage) against Sartre's critique; Piaget comes to the conclusion that the difference between dialectical reason and the structuralist approach is not as great as the two protagonists make out. For Sartre the principal components of dialectical or Marxist thought are constructivism and its corollary historicism. We find Piaget affirming constructivism as an essential element in both structuralism and dialectical thinking. But Sartre claimed, now we can say ~~w~~wrongly, that constructivism was peculiar to philosophy and alien to science. Everybody, including Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, knows that science is a constructivistic and not a descriptive enterprise. But science itself requires the dialectical method and not merely the analytical reason. Construction itself begets the negations which lead to reconstruction, in science, in dialectical thought and in the structuralist method.

(15) Paris 1960

(16) J. Piaget Structuralism, Eng. Tr. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971.

The other important protagonists who have entered the Marxist-Structuralist debate in France are the neo-Marxist or ex-Marxist ideologists L. Althusser (17) Lucien Sebag (18) and Henri Lefèbvre.

Louis Althusser, one of the Black Sheep of the French Communist party, recommends a new reading of Marx himself in Structuralist terms. Insisting that Marx was at first a humanist committed to Man as Freedom and Reason, Althusser claims that he after 1848 became a scientific socialist. Humanism is an ideology, whereas Socialism is Science, according to Althusser's Structuralist thinking and the two cannot be identified or united. The early Marx was not scientific, but an ideologist who pursued the illusion of an "essence of Man". Ideology and science are both the effects of human knowledge, but in ideology the practical concern triumphs over the theoretical interest. Ideology is thus an unconsciously generated structure of a social totality, which imprisons man and dictates to him how he should see reality.

The later (post 1848) Marx, according to Althusser, abandoned the ideology of humanism and pursued the science of socialism, which takes observed details seriously in terms of

(17) Althusser is the author of Four Marx, Paris 1965 and Lire le Capital 2 vol. Paris, 1966 in both of which he makes references to the Marxism-Structuralism debate.

(18) Lucien Sebag Marxisme et Structuralisme, Paris, 1964.

how they relate to the totality of the structure and how they function within the structure. The mature Marx abandoned all concepts of homo economicus or homo historicus or homo faber as a definition of Man. We should also forget all pre-conceptions about Man as the centre or subject or object of world history. The true "subject" of economic activity is neither Man as Producer, nor Man as Consumer or Distributor; the true subject is the relations of Production, Distribution and Consumption. These relations build a complex system and scientific socialism, nd instead of being ideologically bound to some vague humanist theory of the past, should concern itself with the detailed and careful study of the economic relations, and on the basis of an accurate theory, developed by careful structuring and re-structuring of the details, should proceed to an adequate praxis.

No wonder Althusser's re-reading of Marx has been furiously attacked by other Marxists as "the pseudo-structuralist re-reading of Marx". (19) This leads to the question "Is Structuralism ideology or science?" And here we find the neo-Marxist Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes lining up on one side and the Marxists Jean-Paul Sartre and Lucien Goldmann on the other. While the Structuralists in general insist that Structuralism is a method and not an ideology, a method which provides for the possibility of pluralism in the construction

(19) See e.g. R. Aron, Althusser ou la lecture pseudo-structuraliste de Marx in D'une sainte famille à l'autre, Paris 1969, pp 68 - 276.

and the reconstruction of structures or Weltanschauungen, their opponents want to dub them as ideologists with a pre-conceived or sub-conscious world--view. If Structuralism can be shown to be a closed system of ideas, like Empiricism or Rationalism, then it is practically difficult for it to claim to be a science.

It is understandable that French Marxists are provoked by Structuralism's claims to be a scientific method and its attack on ideology. They are also fascinated by its scientific rigorism which lures away many Marxist theoreticians from their more dogmatically ideological positions. Althusser has quite a school of followers within the French Communist Party. Lucien Sebag in his 1964 work on Marxisme et Structuralisme, shows the limits and lacunae in traditional marxist theory, and seeks to fill up the blanks with the scientific knowledge of Man. Sebag has left the Party. He holds the view that the Marxist assumption of the primacy of the economic is an existential judgment and not a scientific one, based on no empirical deduction. Sebag is a disciple of Levi-Strauss.

Henry Lefèbvre, member of the Party, mounts the attack on the Master himself. He accuses Levi-Strauss of trying to understand human society in terms of linguistic categories and systems. Lefèbvre's 1966 work on Language and Society and his article later in that year on Claude Levi-Strauss and the New Eleatism, was further developed in his 1967 polemic pamphlet, as an

erudite attack on Structuralism. He locates Structuralism in the pre-Socratic hellenic tradition. Heraclitus (fl.ca 500 B.C. and his school emphasized the common becoming of all things. Parmenides of Elea (born ca 515 B.C.) and his school regarded this understanding as deceptive and superficial, it is the human mind that pulls all things together by thinking.

The strife between Heraclitans with their theory of the identity of all things and the Eleatics with their theory of the dialectic nature of all becoming, Lefèbvre sees as a dispute between Immobilists and Dynamic Futurists, between counter-revolutionaries and revolutionaries. In the heart of the time-process, the Scientist discovers discontinuity, analyses the stable parts, the chromosomes and the genes, the atoms and the elements, phonemes and morphemes. This scientific discovery of the discontinuity draws all domains into a common passion - Mathematics and Physics, Biology and Linguistics. And all sciences become seduced into this enterprise of taking things apart and putting them together in new combinations as it pleases them. This is the new game of Technology, which takes everything apart - universal time, world, life and even the future. (20) Thus the new Eleatics, the counter-revolutionaries, would seek to shut out every element of surprise, of the accidental and the unpredictable,

(20) Henri Lefèbvre, in L'homme et la société, No I, 1966, p. 26 cited by Günther Schivy, Der französische Strukturalismus Rowolt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1969, p. 90.

of the new and the revolutionary. They would like to build a world after the model of sub-human reality, to classify and label the individual participants of a society, and fit them as "functionaries" into a bureaucratically controlled technocratic nationalized system, which needs and knows no future, but is sufficient into itself. And all this in the name of Science! Perfection is defined as stability, uniformity, automation - in one word as the system. Structuralism is the ideology of the status quo, which wants to stabilize the present state of inequality between the rich and the poor, the industrially developed and underdeveloped, between the mighty and the miserable. It is an ideology of the fear of change, which scared about the accelerated pace of change, wants to hold everything still by capturing it in their structuralist prison of a system.

Lefebvre's fierce polemic is echoed by Lucien Goldmann, who sees this Pan-structuralism as a reactionary sociological phenomenon. For Goldmann it is the philosophy of a society which seeks to assure for Man a set of relationships with a constantly improving minimum standard of life, but which in the process tends to relieve Man of all responsibility, of all concern about his own existence and the meaning of his life, of all need to reflect or be concerned about the problems of history and transcendence, even of meaning and significance. It is the basis for the development of a modern ~~man~~-humanistic rationalism (21). Structuralism is not science, but ideology

(21) Goldmann, Structuralism, marxisme, existentialisme in l'homme et la société, No 2, 1966, page 108.

which falsifies science.

So much for the criticism of Structuralism which still goes on in France. The quest for certainty based on a method which sees the parts only in terms of the whole and the whole as more than the sum of the parts, despite all its painstaking earnestness is as yet far from the discovery of certainty. Small wonder then that a symposium on Structuralism (22) had to say : "Let us say it frankly : when one asks us about Structuralism, we do not know quite often what he is asking us about. First, there is a rumour running around among the frogs that Structuralism is something like a philosophy and that it would like to do away with many good things, among which is Man in particular... The fact is that one can count today : two positivist Structuralisms (the second accusing the first of Empiricism), one Structuralism quite simply rationalist, two other structuralisms proclaiming the subversion of the subject (the second ~~acc~~using the first of Reductionism); there is a philosophy in the classical sense which uses Structuralism, and many Structuralisms which claim to refute all philosophy, etc."

The quest for certainty by a new method of knowing which would make knowledge quite certain has led only to the most amazing bewilderment and uncertainty. The clear logical mind of the Frenchman has produced a bewildering labyrinth of unclarity.

(22) Oswald Ducrot, Tzevetan Todorov; Dan Sperter, Moustafa Safouan, François Wahl - Qu'est-ce que le Structuralisme? Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1968.

5. Modern Empiricism - Analytic Philosophy

To put all of that variety in one basket is dangerous, but inevitable in the brief compass of this paper. The Vienna circle and Rudolf Carnap, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, British ordinary language philosophy and Metaethics - they do make somewhat strange bed-fellows. Most Indian students of philosophy can be assumed to know enough about English philosophy after the war that I need only drop some names and make some references.

The original positivistic thesis of Auguste Comte that all human thinking goes through three necessary stages of development : first religious or theological thinking, second metaphysical or philosophical thinking, and then third and finally scientific and positive thinking, today stands largely discredited. Modern Empiricists are much more modest than to lay down such universal rules. They would like to confine their remarks to what is observed and experienced. Philosophy cannot get to any general science of Reality. She must willingly abdicate her throne as the queen of sciences. The subject of philosophy is not Reality itself, but statements and ideas about reality that are made by the sciences. The analysis of language as the task of philosophy characterizes Linguistic Philosophy. And philosophy should use ordinary language for its philosophizing, without using abstract terms which cannot refer to anything in experience.

The Vienna Circle (in German Wienerkreis) played a key role in the development of modern Empiricism, a development which required the thought of the Austrian group to be transplanted in the soil of Oxford and Cambridge, there to be watered and nurtured by mathematical logic (Frege, Russell and Whitehead, etc.). The Vienna Circle was a study group of professors and scholars from the various scientific disciplines and they sought to explain to each other what they were doing in their various disciplines. They had to justify their methods to each other. The Circle soon disintegrated in the wake of the Nazi annexation of Austria, and many of the scholars migrated to England and America.

Rudolf Carnap, (1891-1970), for example, developed most of his thinking in Chicago, where he went in 1936, after having taught for five years in Prague, Czechoslovakia. His Introduction to Semantics published in 1942 and Logical Foundations of Probability (1951) had a great influence in the American development of Linguistic Analysis. Carnap tried to show: (1) what meaningful propositions in everyday language are; (2) how meaningless propositions can arise out of the meaningful in ordinary language; and (3) what logically correct language should look like. For example, you can ask the question : "What is out there?" The answer comes "outside is rain". You can ask : "What does rain look like?". You can get a reasonable answer. But if you ask the same questions in a different context : "What is out there?", answer "nothing". Question : "What does nothing look like?" No reasonable answer can be given, for the question, legitimate in the

first case, is not legitimate in the second, because though "nothing" is used as a subject, it refers to no thing and questions about what does not exist become meaningless. That is a "dirty trick" of language, which we must expose.

The exercise is by no means trivial. A lot of "non-Sense" in everyday speech as well as in philosophy can be chased away if we can form adequate ground-rules for meaningful discourse. And this is basically the task of philosophy.

Where Kant sought to base certainty on the analysis of the knowing process, Carnap and the New Empiricists try to base their certainty on the right use of language. Kant began with the demonstration of the Synthetic a priori. The new Empiricist questioned the legitimacy of Kant's project and judged the synthetic a priori as meaningless. Empiricism thus becomes fiercely anti-metaphysical and radically anti-inductive. Philosophy now becomes a no-nonsense discipline; its subject-matter is the deliverances of the other sciences, their hypotheses and theories, their use of the evidence and so on. From his teacher (at Jena) Gottlob Frege, Carnap had learned his mathematical logic well. He asked questions like : Does proposition A have the same meaning as the proposition B? Does A say the same thing as B? Does B follow from A by logical necessity? Or by necessity of natural or physical law? What is a natural or physical law? What is its meaning?

Two ground rules for meaningful propositions.

- (1) A proposition in order to be true must be verifiable
- (2) A proposition in order to be true must be statable clearly.

This "verification" demand soon became problematic, as the conviction grew that many of the deliverances of science were hypotheses which were not directly verifiable. Karl Popper came them to the rescue with his Falsification theory, without which so many so-called "natural laws" would have perished under the blight of the verification theory. "All copper conducts electricity" is a statement which is scientifically respectable, but can it be verified, until we have got all the copper in the world and checked to find out by actual experience whether all copper conducted electricity or only some did? The very point of science is to enable us to predict what would happen according to natural laws - that is to say, to make the prediction that if an electric current is led into a copper wire, it will conduct it. This prediction is made only on the basis of repeated experiments, but not necessarily on the basis of an exhaustive experiment with all copper everywhere. In fact, most scientific knowledge is induced from partial experience. All inductive conclusions are only apparently certain. There is no guarantee that because in the past all copper has conducted electricity, it will do so always and everywhere. That is an assumption we make, and it works, at least until we run up against a copper wire that does not conduct electricity.

So Popper rescues science from becoming an inductive inference by proposing the falsification principle. That is, science says in fact, that it has not been the experience that in any given case copper does not conduct electricity. And the theory that copper conducts electricity is valid until ex-

perience shows that certain kinds of copper do not conduct electricity. The theory rests on the fact that it has not been falsified in experience.

But not all statements are of the same type as "copper conducts electricity" and some statements are more verifiable or falsifiable than others.

For example, a statement like "another planet with human beings does not exist" cannot be verified or falsified until the whole universe has been surveyed which in the nature of the case is not possible.

We can only mention here some of the problems of a thorough-going linguistic analysis as a basis for certainty or as criterion for truth in the briefest possible compass.

(a) All language is not scientific language. There are other languages, e.g. that of ethical exploitation or of poetic expression. Linguistic analysis has begun to work on the first, but not yet on the second in any substantial way.

(b) All truth is not necessarily statable. This is a controversial statement, but its verification or fabrication can only be in experience, not necessarily in language. Ask any practitioner of Zen Buddhism.

(c) All scientific language is an artificial construction, a structure which we impose on reality as a hypothesis, and most of the data verify our hypothesis, but we tend often to ignore the data that falsify a hypothesis which we

have found generally convenient. Science does not usually abandon one theory even when there are cases which falsify it, until it has found a better one. All science thus partakes of uncertainty, and the assumption that all reality will finally yield to our scientific method has not real basis in experience. The certainty of scientific knowledge is far from certain.

But linguistic philosophy has travelled a long way since the Logical Positivism of A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic in 1936 with its debts to the Vienna Circle. Ayer's easy phenomenalism (material-object statements are reducible to or translatable into statements about sense-data) has not stood the test very well. Continental philosophy usually uses analysis to go on to some synthesis. British philosophy seeks to stay with analysis out of a suspicion of constructive systems. They fear, it seems, what man may put in into the construction while nobody is looking. With typical British modesty analytic philosophers make no claim to new knowledge, while the Structuralist for example would willingly admit that structure is a human creation, and that it is man's job to create structures in thought and culture.

But today even the term Analysis is going out of fashion in Linguistic philosophy. G.E. Moore had a clear theory of analysis - that analysis is a process in which a puzzling statement is replaced by another statement which gives the same meaning but is less puzzling. It seeks to clarify puzzling concepts (analysandum or the analyzed material) by providing an alternate and clearer formulation

(analysans). So that we have the equation analysandum = analysans. But this sort of thing is no longer used by linguistic Philosophers. Bertrand Russell gave a different function to Analysis, namely that of breaking down a complex statement into its component parts. Russell also took care to sort out the confusion caused by the idiosyncrasies of the grammar of our languages. For example a supposedly true statement like "the average Indian family has 3.76 children" may logically lead to the conclusion that there is a family in India which has 3.76 children. The error can be eliminated by translating the first statement into what it really means, namely that the number of children in Indian families divided by the number of families yields the factor 3.76. This kind of clarification, by which we eliminate the mythical entity called "average Indian family" was very dear to Russell and the linguistic philosopher still delights in doing that sort of thing.

Logical Positivism was an attempt not merely to eliminate puzzling or misleading statements by replacing them with clearer ones, but also an authoritarian ban on all "metaphysical" statements, to which genre belonged many of the statements of Russell. Metaphysical entities like "facts" or "concepts" are also eliminated. Thought equals statement or language. The new linguistic philosopher would be reluctant to make that identification.

The new Empiricism is much more modest and kind towards metaphysics. They don't want to reinstate metaphysics as a

means of knowing a reality which transcends experience, but to see metaphysical statements as attempts to carry out a high-level revision of concepts to redraw the map of thought.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) born in Austria, a student of Frege and Russell, as has already been said, created two philosophies, which are still discussed in American and British philosophical circles.

His first pithy work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus published in Germany in 1921 and in England in 1922, still remains a classic, though repudiated by the author himself. It is consistently empiricist, except in its starting point, which in all Empirical Systems is usually metaphysical. The starting-point of the Tractatus is that the world consists entirely of simple facts, none of which is in any way dependent on any other, as 7 is not dependent on 17. These facts are the ultimate subject-matter of empirical science. Language has as its purpose the stating of facts. It pictures facts. It has thus a structural similarity to facts. But many facts are assemblages of other facts. And we have many silly linguistic conventions which makes many ordinary language statements mere nonsense. In fact even the statement that language pictures facts is nonsense, because it tries to give a picture of the pictorial relationship between language and fact. We need to construct an ideal language which is tidy and will not tempt anyone to talk nonsense. All philosophy is actually nonsense, and anyone who understood the Tractatus right will not be tempted to philosophize.

Well- Wittgenstein must have understood his own Tractatus; so he abandoned philosophy. (They say the real reason is that he had a mystical experience while serving in the Austrian army in the first world war. He had already completed the work on the Tractatus before joining the army. It seems it was the reading of Tolstoy that triggered the mystical experience.)

In 1929, he returned to Cambridge, this time permanently, living the life of an ascetic and almost a recluse. In 1933, the Blue Book came out, showing precisely why the Tractatus was nonsense, and demolishing all traditional approaches to philosophy, his own included. He now thought it was impossible to construct the ideal language. Language was rather a social tool, there being an indefinite set of languages for differing social purposes, commanding, requesting, cursing, praying, joking, and so on. In fact all language is a game. And there are many games (don't you know Eric Berne's The Games People Play ?). We learn these language games in childhood. One must not take anyone game to be all-important. We must understand which particular game we are playing. You must know the map, otherwise you may never be able to get out of the town and may be going round and round, like the fly inside a bottle, buzzing against the side instead of flying to the top. To learn the language games thoroughly is to have a proper map of thought and to find one's way around.

The Philosophical Investigations (2nd ed. Oxford 1958)

is an attempt to get at these rules of the language game. Well, one game is trying to define a class of facts. Take the word game. How can you define what is common to cricket, bridge, and the language game. Is what is common that which makes it a game? Is it not neater to call these family resemblances rather than try to define what games are?

Philosophy does not explain anything. Everything lies open to view. Everything is on the surface. We make them unnecessarily complicated, because we overlook the simple and the familiar.

Now the present writer has a puzzlement. He has read Wittgenstein, both the former and the latter several times. Why is he regarded as "a great and original philosophical genius"? (23) Somebody should unpuzzle me. I am not English, It is all too subtle for me.

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Gilbert Ryle, whose lectures at Oxford I have attended, continues to be more a luminary than the positivist Ayer, for linguistic philosophers. He has great affinity to Wittgenstein and was the first to clearly define the task of philosophy as "the detection of the sources in linguistic idioms of recurrent misconceptions and absurd theories." (24)

(23) J.O. Urmson, Ed. The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers (N.Y. 1960, Sub voce Wittgenstein, p. 411

(24) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1931-32, developed further in G.Ryle, Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1954.

Ryle's The Concept of Mind (25) still plays an influential role in Anglo-Saxon circles. His strictures on the "ghost in the machine" concept of mind as an extra object inside the body are well taken. His notion that the University of Oxford does not exist apart from the colleges and that the mind is merely an ensemble of feeling, willing and thinking, and not an entity in itself has verisimilitude, and some people take that as the last word in describing the mind-body relationship. Again it puzzles me how people's curiosity can be so quickly satisfied.

In the realm of ethics too linguistic philosophers like C.L. Stevenson and Hare have been doing some heroic plodding in the analysis of ethical language. The descriptive-prescriptive debate about the meaning and function of ethical language is not yet settled, and put in those terms is unlikely to be settled ever. The nature of the good is too deep to be grasped in the net of linguistic philosophy, woven with categories like descriptive-prescriptive or universalist and particular judgments (helping a blind man to cross a street when he wants and needs to do so, is always better than not helping him, says the universalist while the particularist refrains from making such a universalist judgment). Again the growing impression is that the point of diminishing returns has already been reached in the linguistic approach to ethical analysis.

Neither does one need to say much about Pragmatism which in some ways is related to Empiricism. The word pragmatism as a philosophical term comes from the American professor C.S. Peirce (1878). William James and John Dewey

Used the word as a name for a way of thinking. The main point is of course to test the truth and untruth of a statement in terms of the experiential or practical consequences. Philosophy has thus to be expressed in the form: If A is done X will result and if B is done Y will result. Everything is to be understood in terms of human purpose. For Peirce Pragmatism was a theory of meaning. John Dewey tried to make it a theory of Truth. Under Bertrand Russell's attack Dewey withdrew the claim to truth and was satisfied with looking for a criterion of "warranted assertibility". Pragmatism remains the major unsystematic and often concealed philosophical assumption behind a great deal of our current ordinary thinking, which is notoriously utilitarian. Everything is to be judged by its cash value in terms of experience, pleasure or utility. Somebody has yet to write a book on this common man's philosophy in our time. The most elaborate recent attempt to do so was a study undertaken and published by the Russell Sage Foundation in New York (1976) on the Quality of Life, Perceptions, Evaluations and Satisfactions (26) The questionnaire used itself reveals the influence of pragmatism, which continues to be the most influential

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