Unflappability is the better part of valor, especially for a head of government. But some senior statesmen are more adept at dissimulation than others. Mikhail Gorbachev, being more honest than the ordinary run of statesmen, sometimes visibly flaps.
Anyone watching on TV his chairing of the concluding session of the Supreme Soviet in August could see the visible signs of irritation on his face. He did not look With favour on the formation of the lnter-regional Group of People’s Deputies in Moscow Cinema Theatre on July 29 and 30. Gorbachev did not mention Yeltsin by name. He rather mentioned with visible irritation Gavriil Popov who actually chaired the founding assembly of the opposition group. Everybody knew, however, that Yeltsin was the major force in forming an organised anti-Gorbachev group.
In fact, however, things are not that simple. Of course it was Boris Yeltsin who officially announced the formation of‘ the Mezhregionalnaya Grupp in the Supreme Soviet on July 31. But they chose to have five co-chairmen rather than Yeltsin as sole chairman. The others are of varying ilks, Academician Andrei Finltharov, the classical icon of Soviet libernl dissent; Gnvriil Popov; Yuri Afanassief and Viktor Palm, the last mentioned representing the Baltic republics. Their common platform, however, is more than opposition to Gorbachev, more than mere Yeltsinism.
Sergei Borisovich Stankevich, one of the bright young deputies in the opposition described that platform to me as (a) Speedier Democratisation, (b) More efficient economic reconstruction; (c) An effective, just, mixed market-oriented economy; (d)
Self-government by people without bureaucratic administration; (e) Preserving Nature; and (f) Nonviolent resolution of all inter-regional conflicts based on humane compromise. This platform had been published before the founding meeting which was attended on the first day by 393 Deputies, though only 260 had signed up as members constituting the opposition.
The opposition also publishes a weekly newspaper, the Narodnik Deputat. They sought no government permission to publish the newspaper (first issue 100,000 copies at 29 kopeks a copy). They thought that government clearance was unnecessary, since they are people's-Deputies, after all, and acknowledged no authority above them.
Many of the Deputies (41.7 per cent) wanted only an open discussion club, and the discussion to form a distinct organised group was taken with only a 55.4 per cent majority vote. They are independently financed by voluntary contributions into an account at the USSR Zhilsotsbank. Stankevich told me that the State had tried to close this account, but failed. Money is pouring in, at least in the early stage. The Group’s slogan is Vlast-Narodu or Power to the People.
Dr. Stankevich (Ph. D. I983, thesis, US Politics during Nixon Administration), 35 years old, Researcher at the institute of World History, impressed me with his ability, integrity and wide reading. He has become an idol of the young people in the cities. Most of the opposition is drawn from Moscow and Leningrad. At least 70 per cent of its members are also members of CPSU, including Stankevich. This is natural since 83 per cent of the 2250 Deputies are CPSU members.
As many have rightly observed, there is an anomaly in some members of the ruling party joining together to form an opposition in Parliament. Stankevich told me that there are other opposition groups under formation. I did not get the impression that there is any substantial ideological agreement among the members of the group. They are certainly not all Yeltsinites. One senior member, an Academician, gave me the impression that he was more of a social democrat than a communist.
I do think that the emergence of this opposition group should be one of the least of Gorbachev’s headaches. In fact it is eloquent testimony both to the reality of glasnost in the Soviet Union, and to the lack of much constructive thinking anywhere on the horizon in that great land. At the end of Gorbachev’s closing address in the Supreme Soviet, there were opposition deputies who defiantly refused to applaud the speech, and sat with their arms folded -- a sure sign, though not a very refined one, of the new democratic freedom.
In my wide-ranging series of contacts quite a formidable catalogue of complaints emerged. Here is a sample list:
I. Perestroika has not produced any positive results for the ordinary consumer. Prices have gone up, quality of goods in the market has gone down; there are not enough goods on the shelves.
2. Cost Accounting or Khosraschost for the State Enterprises has not worked, because there has been insufficient over-- all planning to ensure alternate employment for surplus labour in the padded workforce of all enterprises or to ensure supply of equipment and raw materials for the factories.
3. Co-operatives have turned out to be largely mere capitalist extortioners, producing low-quality goods at higher prices, making a few rich at the expense of the public, but not contributing much to production increase.
4. The failure is not on the part of the Soviet people, but due to the continuing persistence of the old vertical command system and its apparatus-- that is, the 18 million strong Party and State Bureaucracy. riddled with apathy, inefficiency and corruption.
5. Gorbachevism is largely at the top. Only a small part (perhaps only one per cent) of the 280 million Soviet people has learned to cast off the habits of indifference to public needs, false courtesy or hypocrisy, and slavish, unquestioning obedience to higher authority, ingrained through two generations or more of the command system.
6. The privileges and prerogatives of the Party and State elite have not yet been taken away. While ordinary people stand in long queues for bread and milk, the elite continue to enjoy special supply shops, special medical facilities, automobiles, dachas and so on.
7. The new Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet have done Well to perform in front of the TV cameras. giving the people an opportunity to watch their representatives in action; but what they discussed were merely petty complaints and easy recriminations against erring apparatchiks, not any constructive solutions to the Soviet Union's big problems like Inter-regional tensions and economic stagnation.
8. The present leadership is doing nothing to prevent the disintegration of the socialist system: Comecon nations like Poland opting out of the socialist fold, Soviet republics opting to break away from the Soviet Union.
9. There are still 3.7 million men in arms -- low paid, living under inhuman conditions, uselessly consuming a huge portion of the Union budget; too many Generals than needed; and yet Rust landed in the Red Square without anyone stopping him; so many Soviet nuclear submarines have recently collapsed or got into trouble; a runaway pilotless Soviet Mig-23 plane took off and crashed in Belgium. The whole military set-up needs total overhauling and drastic reduction.
10. Miners strike because their working conditions are incredibly squalid; because they cannot get subsistence provisions for their family needs; their health is not being looked after; sanitation is bad. Trade Unions are on the management side and care nothing for the workers. The All-Union AUCCTU is part of the government, not run by the Workers.
Well, that is only a sample list, and looks fairly formidable. Add to it complaints about rampant bribery and corruption, about an uncontrolled criminal mafia in cahoots with some political forces, an inflation rate reportedly worse than that in China, continuing repression by Party officials in remote areas, and you have enough to grumble about.
From many sources, both conservative and progressive, one heard the call for “a strong hand". One leading political commentator told me that Gorbachev was too soft, as were some in his team like Prime Minister Ryzkov. His view was that this team could not hold the nation together and that some of the top people waiting in the hinterground will have to come forward and take over the reins of power. I did not hear the argument that Ligachov, for example, could do that. Nobody I talked to thought Yeltsin could do it either. Some would back an experienced career diplomat like Yakovlev.
It would be unrealistic to expect a repressive regime emerging soon in the Soviet Union, despite the widespread clamour for a strong hand. The democratic process has taken root in Soviet society and it will be difficult to totally reverse that process. A Stalinist type of regime is for the present at least unthinkable. There is no one group emerging who is a likely candidate for supreme power. The Interregional Group has no such possibility, being too diverse and too loosely organised, and with very limited public support, especially outside the large cities.
To me at least, the only feasible line is the Gorbachev line with some major changes, especially in the economic realm and in the area of the integrity of the Soviet Union. I have no doubt that the present leadership is resigned to what seems like an inescapable development — the falling away of the East European socialist complex, and the emergence of a new European Community which is not rabidly anti-Soviet and which would have a strong socialist orientation. I get the impression that despite words to the contrary, the leadership has reluctantly come to the thought that the Baltic republics would also go, and the most they could expect from these republics is some sort of Finlandisation, that is, free commerce with the West without anti-Sovietism, even often supporting Soviet foreign policy. They cannot accept the possibility of the secession of the southern republics like Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. But once the Baltic Republics and the Comecon states begin their oddyssey towards a European Community, can Armenia and Georgia be stopped? Will not the predominantly Islamic republics of Central Asia demand their own freedom of action and alliance, conceivably with the growingly powerful Pan-Islamic movement?
In the minds of many of my interlocutors, questions like these could be settled only by a strong and flexible leadership -- not the old style reactionary undemocratic leadership of the Stalinist or Trotskyite type -- but one that is both wise and able to exercise power ruthlessly where needed.
Gorhachevism is under fire. It is not so much perestroika and glasnost that people oppose, but the impression of weakness in the face of regional and Comecon break-away processes, and the very poor implementation of economic reforms in both the
state enterprise sector and the so-called co-operative sector. I was told by a well-informed person that there was an attempt to oust Gorbachev from power -- a move within the Party itself -- as recently as July. Obviously Gorbachev has survived many such attempts.